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status of Nature is determined by the contexts within 
which non-human entities are incorporated into human 
cultural understanding. Since our ability to value the 
non-human world is mediated by this understanding of 
what Nature is, a contextualist environmental ethics 
would direct our attention to the social and political 
matrices within which human beings become cognizant 
of that world. 
At a time when contemporary philosophy 
increasingly turns toward contextualist strategies of 
inquiry, writers in environmental ethics still seem to 
prefer the direct investigation of Nature itself. The 
(1) strategy ofcontemporary environmental ethics remains 
predominately foundationalist By this I mean that it 
Does Nature have moral value? The belief that it defends its criticisms of human intervention in Nature 
does lies at the heart of environmental ethics. Yet two by an appeal to a standard ofconduct which lies outside 
very different conceptions ofenvironmental ethics reveal human thought and culture. It is supposed that if we 
themselves when we consider how an answer to such a construe Nature as it really is in itself, then it will be 
question mightbejustified. Themostcommonapproach possible to apprehend the obligations which Nature 
would have us investigate the properties which natural imposes upon human beings with the necessary 
beings possess. The assumption here is that when we philosophical certainty. The foundationalist strategy 
know what these properties are, we will be in a position presupposes timeless criteria of moral relevance which 
to deduce the value of Nature from a determination of forever remain free of the vicissitudes of cultural 
the moral relevance of these properties. Appeals to interpretation. 
sentience, self-consciousness, or lifeas criteria ofmoral But this strategy no longer seems philosophically 
considerability are examples resulting from this type plausible. Lying at the heart of this enterprise is the 
of inquiry. assumption that we can be clear about what Nature 
An alternative approach to environmental ethics, 
which I shall call "contextualist," would have us 
investigate the processes whereby Nature is construed 
as something which either possesses or fails to possess 
moral value. On this view, the value we should place on PHILOSOPHYNaturecannotbe deduced from the way Nature is itself; 
itdepends on the placewhich Nature has acquired in our 
discourses with one another. In other words, the moral 
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requires of us, since Nature is a detenninate something, 
independent of our culturally based interpretation and 
understanding of what it is. Nature is not something in 
itself, but rather an artifact of human cultural life. 
In order to posethe moral question ofourobligations 
to Nature, we necessarily call before us a particular 
conception of what Nature is. It is to Nature as it is 
conceptualized and interpreted by historically situated 
human beings that we relate, not the brute and 
uninterpreted data of biological forces. To say that 
Nature is an artifact is to say that we have no access to 
aNature in itself; our interpretation ofNature can never 
be independent of the intellectual, artistic, emotional, 
and technological resources available to us. These 
resourcesconstitute the matrix, orcontext, within which 
what we call Nature appears to us and within which we 
interpret our experiences of the world. 
Moral reflection necessarily poses the question of 
Nature's value from a standpoint that is contextualized 
within this matrix. Thus, the inquiry into Nature's 
moral status proceeds against the background ofa prior 
interpretation and understanding ofjust what Nature is. 
But this understanding itself presupposes the histor-
ically specific matrix from within which we begin our 
interpretive effort. It follows from this that we cannot 
answer the question concerning Nature's moral value 
abstractly, that is, without frrst specifying a particular 
way of knowing Nature and the concrete results of that 
way ofknowing. That themoral valueoftheenvironment 
depends upon a conception of Nature which in tum is 
relative to a particular way of knowing the world, is the 
contextualistpremiseforpracticing environmentalethics. 
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As an example of the force of this contextualist 
premise, consider how beliefs about the value of 
wilderness areas depend upon the cultural context from 
within which it is perceived. When the Puritans first 
settled the wilderness ofNew England, they found it to 
be the grim and forbidding domain of Satan. Through 
the lenses ofPuritan religious convictions, wild Nature 
possessed only negative value; religious duty demanded 
that it be cut down, cultivated, and domesticated.1 
Following the advent of Romanticism, however, 
landscape painting helped to fonn a more benign 
relationship with those wilderness areas which fit the 
criteriaof the picturesque and the sublime. WildNature 
took on an aesthetic value which could then be used to 
develop conservationist arguments of a moral kind.2 
But in contemporary society, the aesthetic value of 
Nature as a spectacle must compete with economic 
constructions of the wilderness. Notonly do wilderness 
areas contain valuable timber resources, but they offer 
economic opportunities for hunting, fishing, and other 
recreational uses with significant economic importance. 
These uses often lead to a degradation of the aesthetic 
values of wild areas. 
These three perspectives construe Nature 
differently; for one, Nature is a religious entity - the 
domain of Satan - for another, it is an aesthetic entity 
- a picturesque or sublime view - and for a third, it is 
an economic entity - a commercially profitable 
resource. Any answer to the question ofNature's moral 
value, then, will necessarily be guided and informed by 
our conception of the Nature which is intended. Thus, 
inquiry into the moral status of Nature must inevitably 
return to a moral and political investigation of the social 
context within which Nature is constructed. 
Theview thatNature isconstructedwithinparticular 
cultural contexts conflicts with the usual practice of 
environmental ethics. Philosophers engaged in 
environmental ethics tend to presuppose the existence 
of a stable Nature that is both the victim of human 
wrong-doing and the source of guidance on the proper 
path of redemption.3 Despite the internal differences 
between them, most of the competing views about 
environmental ethics agree on two things: first, the way 
in which we ought to treat nonhuman entities follows 
from the properties which those entities possess, so that 
Nature's admittance to participant status in the moral 
community depends upon its objective possession of 
the relevant qualifying characteristics. And second, the 
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function ofan environmental ethic is to help us to return 
from our alienation from Nature so that we may live 
more closely in harmony with it. This will happen when 
we recognize that Nature qualifies for moral 
consideration and actaccordingly. But these two points 
only make sense ifwe also agree thatour understanding 
of Nature and its moral law comes from unmediated 
access to the way that Nature is in itself. If this is not 
possible, then appeals to follow the dictates of Nature 
reduce to appeals to do what is right, as that is defined 
by theenvironmental ethic in question. Nature, therefore, 
is unable to play the independent justificatory role 
which foundationalist ethics requires of it 
(2) 
The idea that Nature should be our moral guide 
appears in a nwnber of different guises, depending on 
the moral theory in question. It informs the arguments 
of those who deny that we have moral obligations to 
Nature as well as those who affirm them. Let me clarify 
what I mean by this. 
In his Lectures Q!!. Ethics, Immanuel Kant denies 
that we can have direct duties to animals because they 
lack certain features necessary to participate in the 
moral community.4 In particular, they lack the capacity 
of reason and free will. Since animals do not possess 
these properties, we can have no moral relations with 
them directly, although we may have obligations 
regarding animals. For example, ifother human beings 
will beadversely affectedby ourmistreatmentofanimals, 
then our direct obligations to other hwnan beings require 
us not to mistreat animals. In any case, the question of 
the moral standing of animals depends, for Kant, on the 
objective properties which beings do or do not possess 
independently of how we think about them. It follows 
that Nature is disqualified from playing the role of 
victim or of moral guide from the Kantian standpoint 
The animal liberation movementattacks the Kantian 
perspective but retains its foundationalist framework.5 
Peter Singerargues, for example, that to be a member of 
the moral community a being must possess sentience, 
that is, the capacity to feel either pleasure or pain. Any 
being which has this property qualifies for moral respect, 
those which do not, remain outside the protection of 
moral strictures. Using this criterion, Singer extends 
the moral community to include certain species of 
animals which clearly can feel pleasure and pain. 
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Proponents of the "land ethic" articulated by Aldo 
Leopold in A Sand. ~ Almanac criticize animal 
liberation theories because they focus too narrowly on 
the individualanimal, with the result that they ignore the 
ecological wholes of which individual animals are a 
part.6 While animal liberationists are primarily 
concerned with our treatment of domestic animals, the 
"land ethic" starts from a concern for wild biotic 
communities. Our moral concern should notbe to avoid 
pain and suffering but, rather, to maintain the stability, 
integrity, and beauty of the biotic community as a 
whole. That is what has moral value. Thus, all aspects 
of Nature come to have moral value, from this 
perspective, insofar as they contribute to the stability, 
integrity, and beauty of the ecosystem. 
The "land ethic" thereby greatly extends the scope 
of the moral community. Nonetheless, the argument 
supposes that Nature can only make a moral claim on 
human beings to the extent that it satisfies an objective 
demand, namely, that the natural entity in question be 
significant for the health of the ecosystem. Ifit does not 
have that property, or if it in some way is a threat to the 
health of the ecosystem, then that natural entity is 
excluded from moralprotection. Thus, someproponents 
of the "land ethic" suppose that hunting is compatible 
with their moral concern for the stability, integrity, and 
beauty of the biotic community.7 
Some members of the eco-feministmovementalso 
follow the same sort of strategy.8 The common 
commitment to foundationalism manifests itself 
differentlyin eco-fern inism, however. The significance 
oftheeco-fern inistcontribution to environmental ethics 
lies in its recognition that the environmental crisis is not 
merely a product of human relations to Nature. Rather, 
it is a symptom of oppressive relations between hwnan 
beings as well. They draw a connection, then, between 
the culture's willingness to ignore the interests of non-
human beings and the culture's willingness to ignore 
and suppress the interests and needs ofwomen. Western 
philosophy has consistently drawn a distinction between 
culture and nature and associated men with culture and 
women with nature.9 Patriarchal control of Nature is 
seen, therefore, as intimately bound up with patriarchal 
control of women. 
For more radical members of the eco-feminist 
movement these parallels suggest the possibility that 
women are in fact "closer to Nature" than men. While 
men are fundamentally alienated from natural processes, 
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women have managed to retain closer ties to Nature, and 
are thus in a privileged position to care for Nature and 
to guide the culture in its return to a way of life more in 
harmony with Nature. But this position also evinces the 
commitment to a Nature which exists independently of 
human culture. Ifwe are to make sense of the notion that 
women are "closer to Nature" than men, we must frrst 
make sense of the notion that there is an objective 
Nature there to be"closerto" in thefrrstplace. Wemust 
agree, in otherwords, that thesedualisms which separate 
men from women and culture from Nature are not 
merely patriarchal constructs, butreflections of the way 
in which Nature truly is. 
The positions which I have just identified all share 
allegiance to the two points I mentioned earlier. They 
agree that our moral obligations depend upon what 
properties the object actually has and that a proper 
understanding oftheseproperties will allow us to return 
to a close and hannonious moral relationship with the 
natural world. In the rest of this paper I shall indicate 
some aspects of the alternative position Iam proposing. 
(3) 
In order to make Nature our guide in matters of 
morality we have to understand what Nature is. This, it 
seems to me, is more problematic an undertaking than 
many in environmental ethics suppose. Our 
understanding of Nature is the product of cultural 
institutions and the plurality of interpretations of the 
natural world which they make available. Before we 
can make Nature our moral guide, we must ask how our 
present understanding of Nature was constructed and 
how ithas led us ontotheparticularpath ofenvironmental 
destruction we currently follow. From that standpoint 
we should ask not, how is Nature really constructed? 
Rather, we should ask, what understanding of Nature 
would support and sustain a life which is morally 
responsible both towards the environment and towards 
other human beings? 
Several interpretive frameworks exist for 
approaching the question of how to construe Nature, 
although the cultural origins of these frameworks are 
often obscured by theirproponents. Formembers ofthe 
Deep Ecology movement, for example, our problems 
with the environment stem from our one-sided 
anthropocentrism and concern with ever-increasing 
material consumption.!0 Theanthropocentric tradition, 
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which DeepEcology attacks, perceivesNature as inferior 
to human nature because it lacks the properties of 
rationality and freedom which are essential to human 
moral Slams. Nature is thus perceived as out there to 
satisfy human needs and purposes, perhaps "given" by 
God for these ends. 
For eco-feminism, on the other hand, it is the 
exploitive impulse inherent in men, or in the male 
principle as iUs manifested in patriarchal institutions, 
which explains how it is possible for our culture to 
marginalize Nature as a force in moral deliberation. 
Patriarchal culture perceives Nature as an antagonist, an 
opponent to be conquered, subdued, and overcome. It 
perceives natural entities as competitors and threats 
which mustbeneutralized. Sucha cuIture is symbolized 
by the male hunter who supposes that the life which is 
most in harmony with Nature is one given to the pursuit 
and killing of wild animals.!! 
And for Marxists and anarchists, acertainblindness 
towards the environment appears to be inherent in the 
capitalist mode of production.! 2 Profit and efficiency 
have not motivated ecologically responsible productive 
practices. For the capitalist, Nature is perceived as a 
source of raw materials for mass production. Drained of 
moral value, it is a material universe to be used for the 
increase of private profit and advantage in the most 
economically efficient manner possible. 
When I say that these are interpretive frameworks, 
I mean that these explanations of the environmental 
crisis do not just attack particular forms of human 
action, butalso critique the particularwaysofconstruing 
Nature which appear to justify the unwanted human 
action. Deep Ecology, eco-feminism, Marxism, and 
anarchism provide examples of the sort of frameworks 
without which defining what is morally problematic 
about human relations with the environment would be 
impossible. 
Once we recognize the presence of interpretive 
frameworks such as those I have just identified, it 
becomes clear that without such frameworks, 'Nature' 
remains an empty term and the relevance of ethics to 
Nature becomes completely undecidable. If this is so, 
then Naturecan only guide us ifwe accept the framework 
within which someparticularNaturehasalready acquired 
a meaning and a value for us. And if we oppose specific 
human practices because of their effects on the 
environment, then our critique cannot simply appeal to 
Nature as foundation and legitimation, but, rather, must 
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ftrst seem to uncover the process of construing Nature 
which buttresses those practicesand the habits ofthought 
which motivate them. We might then try to articulate 
new interpretations of Nature that would motivate 
alternative practices. 
(4) 
Let me say something briefly about two ways in 
which how we construe Nature in our present culture is 
a reflection of thought patterns intrinsic to cultural 
categories quite separate from any notion of a Nature in 
itself. First, we live in a society whose economic health 
depends upon expanding commodity production. We 
should expect, therefore, that Nature will have been 
enlisted to support this project. Second, we live in a 
society which has gradually objectiftedhuman beings 
in the process of transforming them into participants in 
capitalist processes of production. We might expect, 
therefore, to ftnd that Nature, too, has been objectifted 
as a consequence of this procesS.13 In order to see this, 
we might ask, what interpretation of Nature would 
support the demands for economic growth which are 
part of the capitalist economy? Certainly, a view of 
nonhuman entities ascontainingspirits, needs, interests, 
or rights runs contrary to the desire to treat nature as a 
mere source of raw materials. Rather than following 
animistic constructions of Nature, our culture tends to 
give priority to a vision of Nature constructed by the 
natural sciences. This is true despite the fact that most 
people are ill-equipped to comprehend the world which 
is so constructed.14 The dominance of the natural 
scientific view of Nature as the site of merely physical 
relations and forces does not just advance a particular 
cognitiveproject Italsogives legitimacy to theeconomic 
and political interests of those engaged in commodity 
production under present conditions by undermining 
alternative construals of Nature which would invest it 
with moral and aesthetic values capable of justifying a 
moral critique of the prevailing social system.1S 
Mass production can proceed most efftciently if 
Nature becomes invisible to human beings or is visible 
only as a commodity in the production process itself. It 
becomes invisible when the majority of the population 
no longer live in direct contact with the land nor make 
their livelihood from an understanding of the physical 
objects and processes of the environment16 For urban 
culture, Nature regains its visibility in the visual images 
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of landscape painting, travel posters, television 
documentaries, and advertising photographs. These 
images have two signiftcantfeatures. First. they construe 
Nature as a spectacle that has value to the extent that it 
possesses certain aesthetic visual qualities. Nature is 
understood to be external to the everyday life of a 
person, a place to visit for relaxation or ediftcation, like 
a museum or zoo, but not a place in which to live. As 
such, Nature is understood in terms ofthe masks held up 
by the artist and the leisure industry. 
The second feature of these images is that they 
construct Nature as a commodity to be purchased by an 
otherwise passive consumer. One buys the leisure 
weekend, or the vacation package, in order to recuperate 
from the everyday life of work. But this purchase 
promotes only an external relation to what is purchased. 
It is not a living interaction but a passive appreciation of 
the spectacle, which one buys. And in the name of this 
purchase the economy is licensed to continue to destroy 
Nature through "business-as-usual" - to make the 
leisure industry both possible and necessary - while 
at the same time preserving selected bits of it for 
selective enjoyment. 
To say that our culture seeks to render Nature 
invisible and to translate it into a human commodity 
does not entail that it has been fully successful. The 
unwillingness of people to move from economically 
depressed rural areas on accountof the "way oflife" that 
is possible there, reveals the extent to which economic 
rationality has failed to uniformly dominate the 
deliberations of individuals. People do not, in fact, 
think solely in terms of their economic advantage. 
However, within the framework of a capitalist society, 
such individuals expose themselves to the suspicion 
that they must then be responsible for any consequent 
economic harm which they suffer, since they have 
failed to act in a fully rational manner. But that is 
precisely the problem. What it is reasonable to do, and 
what we can truly and literally say about the natural 
world depend upon the discourses of the dominant 
mode of thinking, in this case on capitalist economics 
and the natural sciences. Alternative patternsofthought 
and action inevitably appearmarginal and eccentric. As 
such they are more easily ignored. 
At this point, we must resist asking whether 
economic and natural scientiftc discourses correctly 
characterize Nature as it really is. Since what Nature is 
is a function ofa particularway ofknowing and thinking 
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about it, we might instead ask, who is empowered and 
who is subjugated by construing Nature in economic 
and natural scientific terms?17 Putting the question this 
way side-steps our impulse to engage a definition of 
Nature as if all that were at stake was a question of fact. 
It acknowledges the pragmatic or performative 
dimension of any understanding ofNature. We are led, 
that is, to evaluate the merits of a view of Nature not 
simply according to the canons of scientific method or 
economic efficiency, butalso with regard to itspractical 
moral and political implications for our lives and what 
we value. And this is no small matter. It is clear that the 
dominant construal ofNature ignores and marginalizes 
other forms of understanding and living in the world. 
This makes it difficult for us to perceive other ways in 
which Nature exists or to take seriously those who do 
perceive the world in ways which deviate from the 
mainstream perspective. 
(5) 
I am suggesting, then, that inquiry into Nature's 
moral value cannot be separated from inquiry into the 
ways in which we construe Nature to defend or attack 
the economic, social, and political practices and 
institutions of our society. It is no accident that the 
environmentalistmovementhas an uphill struggle trying 
to argue that Nature has intrinsic moral value or moral 
standing independent of human self-interest. Such 
conclusions require that we understand and perceive 
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Nature in ways that are different from those which 
currently sustain the mainstream activities of Westem 
industrial cultures. 
But what alternative do we really have, it might be 
asked, given that we cannot simply decide to believe 
that trees and animals have spirits or that they are gods, 
justbecause that mightbe a view ofNature which would 
limitouraggressionagainstit? Iamnotsurethataclear, 
socially meaningful alternative does exist at the present 
time. Nonetheless, there is a model for what we might 
do ifwe take seriously the need to re-construe Nature as 
a part of re-valuing it This model may be found in the 
writings of literary naturalists. 
It is significant that most of the great figures in the 
environmentalist tradition are literary not philosophical 
writers. Thoreau, Burroughs, Muir, Leopold, Abbe, 
and Lopez, to name a few, all stand out as proponents of 
a moral relationship with Nature, yet are best known for 
their narrative depictions of particular settings, not for 
their abstract, theoretical arguments. What this literary 
tradition makes possible is a moral and philosophical 
association with place which is not narrowly economic, 
self-interested, orpolitical. Itre-introduces subjectivity 
and moral connectedness into the landscape. Walden 
Pond - to take the best know example - is no longer 
just a small lake near Concord, Massachusetts.l8 It 
functions as a sign ofThoreau's ideas about the way one 
should live life. As such, Walden Pond has become a 
symbol which serves to recall Thoreau's writing and the 
respect and admiration for natural beings which he 
helped to promote.19 
In the language of rhetoric, naturalist literature 
empowers the landscape through the figure of 
metonymy.20 That is, the landscape acquires agency 
through this literature because it creates a close 
connection between places and particular ideas, values 
and experiences. To say that the landscape can speak to 
us is no more mystical and obscure than to say that the 
White House denied all knowledge, or that the Church 
announced its disapproval; all three are metonymic 
statements. Thus the association ofparticular ideas and 
narrativeswith landmarks inNatureprovidesoneavenue 
by which Nature can be re-invested with a subjectivity 
denied to it by current exploitive interpretations. The 
broader task implied here is to incorporate physical into 
social and moral geography in such a way that Nature 
ceases to function invisibly, external to the everyday 
life of human beings.21 
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At a time when philosophers are acknowledging 
that thepursuitofphilosophicalabsolutesandindubitable 
certainties is abankrupt project, it is unfortunate to find 
the tradition of environmental ethics looking to Nature 
to find justsuch treasures.22 Appeals to"followNature" 
or to live in "harmony with Nature" mask the contexts 
which have given birth to the image of Nature one is to 
follow or harmonize with. Ifenvironmental ethics is to 
be critical, then it must participate in the discourses 
which construe Nature and reflecton the desires, needs, 
and motivations whichconstitute thosediscourses. Only 
from within this participation does it make sense to ask 
the normative question, how ought we to relate to 
Nature from the moral point of view? 
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Gi.nt he.vy perfumed m.gnoU. buds 
The smooth voluptuous flesh of their peuls 
Uke unmounted jewels on n.ked bnnches, 
The uplifted .rms of the trees 
Lost in .iry clouds of new green J.ce 
Tr.ced .g.inst the d.rk winter pine. 
P.le froth of pink blossom. 
Young strong breezes 
And endless sky. 
Spring h.s come .g.in, 
hrth gives birth 
hirer th.n I ever remember 
As if to s.y: 
This is my love story. 
Look.t me. 
C.nnot you see 
How be.uUfui I .m. 
Adore me. 
I .m Goddess. 
I.m 
The He.rt of Mystery. 
Mary de La Valette 
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